A 🇨🇳 intelligence ring, which was active for the past 5 years, has been shattered in Turkey. Its operatives eavesdropped on Uyghurs and Turkish officials using IMSI-catchers, which function as fake base stations to collect data, phone logs, conversations and other information from nearby phones.

7 suspects, all 🇨🇳 citizens, were caught red-handed when their vehicles were found carrying IMSI-catcher devices.

The cell’s leader, a 🇨🇳 citizen identified by the initials ZL, allegedly arrived in Turkey five years ago to establish the groundwork for the intelligence operation. This included setting up shell companies, such as a logistics firm and an import-export company, and learning Turkish to better coordinate the efforts.

The suspects established a sophisticated operation that was self-funded by preying on regular Turkish citizens.

They hacked into bank accounts to drain savings for operational expenses, while their primary aim was to collect personal information belonging to Uyghurs and Turkish officials.

IMSI-catcher devices mimic legitimate mobile phone tower signals. When a target's phone comes within approximately 50m of an active ghost base station, it connects to the device, believing it to be a normal cell tower.

The intercepted data, including communication details and location coordinates, was sent directly to a handler in China, whom the spies referred to as the "big boss".

Investigators were surprised by how these devices were smuggled into Turkey without detection.

The smuggling was carried out in parts: one courier would bring only the antennas, another would bring only the batteries on a separate flight, and others would transport the remaining components on different trips to conceal the equipment's true nature.

The ring's primary focus was on Uyghur Turks residing in Turkey, particularly those perceived by Beijing as being involved in anti-China activities.
The spies monitored their targets’ communications, contacts (both in Turkey and China), and movements in Istanbul, Izmir, Manisa, Balikesir and Bursa.

They also targeted Turkish public officials, aiming to identify which were in contact with the targeted Uyghurs or groups and potentially gather other sensitive information.

While authorities believe ZL was a specially trained spy, other members did not appear to have specific talents.

One member had a primary school education. His role was to transport the ghost base station in a vehicle, position it near targets and operate the device by simply turning it on and off.

Another one claimed during his interrogation that he was an elevator repairman in China, likely a cover identity. Four other people are believed to have acted as couriers, bringing the device parts into Turkey.

All seven suspects denied being part of a ring and claimed not to know each other. However, investigators reportedly have evidence that they held meetings periodically and were in contact.

https://t.co/U14nU2CCHk

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