💥第六篇 溯本追源，拆解三年初王志安直播6小时
我为何也被他洗脑？
假中立，真招安：王志安的“价值中立”骗局全解析

【一】

他口口声声说：

“我只是讲事实，不讲立场。”
🤬🤬🤬“我不反中，不反体制。”

听上去理性温和，
其实是他为自己留下的回归体制的后门。

他装作中立，实则算计。
他明知一旦真正站在自由这一边，就再也回不去了。
所以——他不站边、不表态、不承担。
他不想被流放，他想被重新招安。

【二】
两场直播总计6小时，1次10万粉，1次30万粉，他最常提的词不是“真相”，
而是“影响力”。

“我们要做到一百万粉丝。”
“让十四亿中国人都看到我。”
“影响力越大越安全。”
这就是他的核心逻辑：
只要能被更多人看见，就算成功。

他不是在追求真相，
他是在追求被体制重新需要的那一刻。
在这个意义上，他不是在做媒体，
而是在经营一场重新入场的政治营销。
【三】
他一边骂中共封锁言论，
一边又对央视十八年的生涯满怀感恩。
“央视培养了我。”
“那是我新闻人生中最宝贵的阶段。”
“体制有问题，但人没有原罪。”

🤬🤬🤬这话说得漂亮，
但本质是给自己过去洗白、
也替体制洗白。

他把自己包装成“受害者”，
这样一来——
既能博取同情，又能为自己回头留路。

可笑的是，
他说自己“被体制逼出来”，
却从未真心离开。
他只是站在体制的门口做生意。
【四】

他说自己“价值中立”，
🤬可他最中立的地方，恰恰是对邪恶的沉默。
🤬面对独裁，他中立；
🤬面对压迫，他中立；
🤬面对中国人受苦，他依旧中立。
因为他知道，只要保持“模糊”，
体制那边就不会彻底关门。
他要的不是立场的清白，
而是角色的可兼容性——
今天可以被称为“独立记者”，
🤬🤬🤬明天也能被中共重新“重用”。

【五】
他说要“帮境内人了解境外世界”，
但他做的每一步，都在刻意维持“能被境内传播的灰度”。

他拍的视频，不触线、
他讲的观点，不越界、
他骂的目标，永远是安全的。
他的节目定位，不是新闻——
而是一种“可出口、可回收的舆论产品”。
这类内容在算法眼中干净、在中共眼中可用、
在观众眼中则像“真话的替代品”。
他靠这种模糊性赚流量、积人设、
同时稳住体制那边的观察。
这不是新闻人，
这是一个随时准备被官方重新封神的演员。

【六】

他甚至在直播里说：

💢💢💢💢“如果条件允许，我当然希望能回国发展。”
一句“当然”，
暴露了全部真实目的。

他口中所谓的“自由”，
不过是临时避风港。
只要中共愿意开门，他立刻回身，
摇身一变又成“体制改革派”。
他不是逃离，是等待；
不是觉醒，是布局。
【七】

最危险的不是他骗谁，
而是他在教更多人相信：
中立就等于理性，沉默就等于高尚。
他用“中立”粉饰怯懦，
用“理性”掩盖机会主义，
用“影响力”取代良知。
他拒绝对暴政发声，
却不断对反抗者指责“极端”；
他一边享受民主社会的自由，
一边讥笑真正反共的声音太“激烈”。

这是伪善的极致：
吃着自由的饭，讲着专制的理。
【八】
别再被他那一副“冷静客观”的面孔骗了。

他所有的克制，
都是为了将来有朝一日能再度入场；
他所有的“理性”，
都是为了给自己洗白；
他所有的“中立”，
都是为了让体制放心、观众不弃。
他不是记者，
他是体制的一面备用镜——
一旦风向转变，他可以立刻反射出新的忠诚。
【九】
真正的中立，是对真相负责。
而他的中立，是对权力负责。

他不是“失去立场的记者”，
他是“等待被重新召回的宣传员”。

【十】

假中立，真招安。
他口中所谓的“讲事实”，
其实是——
为中共找回自己曾丢掉的那张“可信的脸”。
当一个人把“真相”当成通关密码，
他就已经不配再被称为记者。
🤬🤬🤬他只是个在流亡外衣下的“海外宣传官”。
Fake Neutrality, True Compatibility: How Wang Zhian Shapes Himself into a “Media Form That Can Be Recruited at Any Time”

Wang Zhian’s two live streams, seemingly a middle-aged journalist’s comeback declaration, are in fact a complete self-positioning report: he aims to become an “independent media personality” who is not anti-China, not anti-regime, can appeal to both sides, and wields the greatest influence in the global Chinese-language sphere.
He says he “tells the truth, not slogans,” but what the live streams truly reveal is not idealism, but a career design that is compatible with the regime and paves the way for reuse.

From the banner of “value neutrality” to the ambition of “maximizing influence,” from mobilizing “mainland Chinese to climb the wall to watch the show” to the rhetoric that “CCTV is not guilty of original sin,” this self-proclaimed “former CCTV journalist” is actually preparing for a structural return: when the regime needs a new “credible media face,” he hopes to remain the best candidate for re-recruitment.

II. First Layer of Camouflage: Using “Value Neutrality” to Cover Political Non-Commitment

In the live streams, Wang Zhian repeatedly emphasized—

“I am not anti-China, I want to maintain value neutrality”;
“I want to interview both Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen”;
“What overseas lacks least are people shouting slogans.”

This is not professional self-discipline, but a rhetorical defense. He knows full well that once he clearly states “support for liberal democracy,” he will lose tolerance from the regime; and if he goes fully anti-communist, he will lose his mainland information chain. Thus, he chooses a “fake neutrality” that neither takes sides nor loses interfaces.

The so-called “neutrality,” in practice, manifests as—
He criticizes individual incidents but never touches the structural problems of the regime;
He “questions personal corruption” but always avoids asking “why corruption can occur systemically”;
He “talks about truth,” but that truth never challenges the red lines.

This “neutrality” is not a professional bottom line, but a safety belt for power symbiosis.
Its essence is to reserve a retreat route for himself to return to the country at any time.

III. Second Layer Strategy: Replacing Value Judgment with “Influence Maximization”

In the same live stream, his core phrases repeatedly appeared—

“We will reach 1 million fans in six months”;
“20,000 paid subscribers and we can survive”;
“The greater the influence, the safer”;
“If Zelenskyy accepts my interview, it would be equivalent to giving a speech in the Chinese parliament.”

His logic is extremely clear: influence itself is the highest justice.
When “influence” becomes the ultimate goal, any strategic shift can be self-justified—
whether changing stance, catering to tastes, or being officially reused, it can all be explained as “to influence more people.”

This is his most typical professional calculation:
Regardless of black and white, only seeking traffic; regardless of stance, only seeking “maximum reach.”
He even says: “I want to tell the truth to 1.4 billion Chinese people,”
but in fact, he cares more about how to make 1.4 billion people see him again.

IV. Third Layer Operation: Maintaining Stickiness to the Mainland Discourse Field, Deliberately Preserving Transmissibility

He says he will “invite domestic parties involved to Japan to record programs” and “mobilize viewers to teach relatives and friends to climb the wall to watch videos.”
This sounds like journalistic courage, but in substance it is a precise calculation:
He controls program content within the fuzzy zone of “regime edges”—
enough to make domestic viewers feel “daring to speak,”
yet not completely blocked;
enough to appear “independent,”
yet still “visible.”

This structural ambiguity makes him a “grayscale public opinion asset”:
able to attract suppressed audience emotions without being completely rejected by the regime.
Once the political climate loosens, he can complete a turn with one sentence:

“I have always only been telling the truth, never anti-regime.”

V. Fourth Layer Narrative: De-Stigmatizing CCTV and Regime Media

Wang Zhian repeatedly mentions that “working at CCTV is not a disgrace” and “journalists within the system also have conscience.”
He says: “The system has problems, but people are not guilty of original sin.”

This segment sounds like a mild humanistic stance,
but in reality it serves to whitewash the propaganda machine.
He packages himself as a “victim of the system” rather than a “participant in the system,”
thus gaining sympathy while removing obstacles for his future “return to the system.”

More importantly, in the live streams he deliberately downplays the systemic problems of the regime,
instead emphasizing “the conscience of professional journalists.”
This is a typical “system blanking” narrative:
not denying the machine, only denying the noise.

VI. Fifth Layer Dependence: Information Sources Still Tied to China

In the live streams, he reveals:

“I always call domestic professionals to get materials before making programs”;
“A lot of my information comes from Twitter private messages and domestic industry friends.”

This means his news judgment still depends on information supply from within China.
And this structural dependence determines that he cannot completely sever ties with the regime.
When information flow, relationship chains, and audience groups all remain in China, his so-called “overseas independent media”
becomes a “offshore extension of the regime.”

He can neither afford to offend the regime nor dare to cut off sources;
his “professional ethics” are precisely controlled by this invisible umbilical cord.

VII. Sixth Layer Compatibility: Actively Aligning with Official Tone in Historical Narrative

Wang Zhian repeatedly praises Deng Xiaoping: “We should thank the leaders who made Chinese people’s lives better.”
Such expressions seem warm, but in reality they are active compatibility with the main melody narrative.

He does not talk about the costs of reform, nor how power monopolizes the dividends.
He only emphasizes “making lives better,” which is the most typical CCP propaganda logic.
This language is precisely the safest bridge for returning to the regime.
It can gain official favor while being packaged as “rational and fair” in front of overseas audiences.

VIII. Seventh Layer Psychology: Always Leaving a Door for “Rebuilding the Situation”

He candidly says:

“I hope to rebuild the ‘Situation’ program”;
“I do not rule out setting up a second office in the United States”;
“In the future, if conditions are right, I may also return to China.”

This sentence is the core key to the entire live stream.
All his “career planning”—recruiting people, fundraising, making programs, climbing walls, spreading—
points to one ultimate goal: regaining platform and discourse power.

This “platform” can be YouTube, a Tokyo studio, or a reuse slot in China’s mainstream media.
He does not refuse to be used by the regime, but hopes to be reused by the regime in a “civilian posture,”
in order to gain higher legitimacy and influence.

In other words: he is not a betrayer of the regime, but a person waiting for the regime to summon him again.

IX. Conclusion: The Ultimate Direction of Fake Neutrality Is Compatibility with Power

Wang Zhian says he “wants to build the world’s most influential Chinese-language in-depth reporting team,”
but he never defines the direction of “depth.”
He refuses stance, refuses commitment, refuses bottom lines,
the only thing he does not refuse is possibility—especially the possibility of the regime reusing him.

He is not a true defector, but a temporarily exiled technocrat.
His neutrality is not ethics, but strategy;
his rationality is not independence, but an optimization of catering to power.

X. Three Ultimate Questions

1️⃣ If you truly believe in press freedom,
why do you never clearly state that you support it?

2️⃣ If you are truly pursuing truth,
why do you let “influence” override values?

3️⃣ If you have truly broken with the regime,
why do you still package yourself with regime language, regime logic, and regime narrative?

When a person shouts “I want to tell the truth” on one hand,
while calculating “which truth is safest” on the other,
he is no longer a journalist, but a reserve asset of the regime.

Epilogue:

He repeatedly says “I want 1.4 billion Chinese people to see the truth,”
but what he truly wants 1.4 billion people to see
is simply—that he can still be trusted, utilized, and recalled.

@Nobody197575

@Zealots2022

@SolomonYue

@USCIS

@FBI

@ICEgov

@Zealots2022

@usa912152217

@tangbaiqiao

@EricLDaugh

@GordonGChang

@GuntherEagleman

@w_terrence

@jp20230630

@IrisTaoTV

@Zealots2022

@tangbaiqiao

@EricLDaugh

@GaryQ37208050

@BobWang71661875

@ChooLucia

@DHSgov

@elonmusk

@VP

@Pathusa