Rorty famously argued that analytic philosophy had been caught in a time lag that looked to Kant as the model of philosophizing, while the rest of the world had moved on with Hegel, Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche. This diagnosis is mistaken.

I agree with Sellars in that analytic philosophy has remained, despite advances after him, in a strictly Humean phase, and that it is Anglo-Saxon empiricism that continues to define its major inspiration, in turn derived from Aristotle, hostage the epistemological foundationalism he castigated under the label of the myth of the given. Sellars of course had in mind the empiricist, positivist, phenomenalist programs of the day, but I think his diagnosis holds despite avid readers of Kant emerging in the tradition (Strawson, Carnap, Sellars himself...).

This diagnosis is easy to see in the early forms of the analytic project stemming from Russel and Moore's common-sense/direct realist recoil against British Hegelianism, and obviously logical empiricism. But it continues after the so-called "pragmatist" challenge to the semantic project of analysis, as Brandom calls it.

The aftermath of this critical sequence branches in three major paths, as I see it, which often overlap (Quine, Sellars, Putnam, Searle, being the major examples)

1) The pragmatist project of shifting from the analysis of meaning to that of use, following through the promise of Austin and the later Wittgenstein. This leads to the sociologized,s rehabilitation of the pragmatist legacy and to a more capacious effort.

2) The scientificist project of sticking to the project of conceptual analysis even without the systematic ambitions of the positivist program. The idea was that as long as the discipline kept close to the model and advances of the sciences, the task of conceptual clarification could survive the deflation of the foundationalist ambitions of the positivist program. Naturalist and social scientific programs that stuck to advances in the empirical sciences continued this trajectory.

3) Neosystematic attempts to traverse the critique of empiricism, modality, through the rise in the new modal logic, reigniting the metaphysical ambitions of philosophy after Stalnaker, Kripke, and Lewis. We also find here projects to rekindle the semantic project without the foundationalist hubris, in the Davidson program, for instance. This third vector, unique yet at this point less pervasive, has the distinctice feature of gravitating closest to rationalist metaphysics ala Leibniz than empiricism.

In none of these strands, however, there was anything analogous to the critical turn. The closest attempt was Sellars and his followers (barring freaks like Puntel), who remain a relatively smal but by no means inconsequential expression of the disipline.